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ABSTRACT 
 
Knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers is key to answering ethical questions 
about the work of engineers, because the decisions made by engineers often have ethical 
dimensions and implications. Engineers develop and implement technologies that 
influence and shape the way we live, at times in manners unanticipated by those who 
develop such technologies. To be able to answer important ethical questions, it is 
essential first to define what the responsibilities of engineers are. 
 
This paper defines the responsibilities of engineers by considering what constitutes the 
nature of engineering as a particular form of activity. Specifically, this paper focuses on 
the responsibilities of engineers qua engineers, where that refers to the duties acquired in 
virtue of being a member of a group.  In order to answer this question, this paper 
examines the practice of engineering, drawing on the idea of practices developed by 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and showing how the elements of a practice are 
important for finding and justifying the responsibilities of engineers.   
 
To demonstrate the contribution that knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers 
makes to engineering ethics, a case study is discussed at the end of the paper which deals 
with ethical questions in the discipline of structural engineering. The circumstances 
surrounding the failure of the Sleipner A platform off the coast of Norway in 1991 will 
be discussed to demonstrate how the responsibilities of engineers can be derived from 
knowledge of the nature of engineering and its context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers is key to answering ethical questions 
about the work of engineers. The decisions made by engineers often have ethical 
dimensions and implications.  Engineers develop and implement technologies that 
influence and shape the way we live, at times in manners unanticipated by those who 
develop such technologies. Engineering projects also have an increasing tendency to 
influence large populations.  One way that engineers impact society is by maintaining 
roles in industry and academia which influence public policy (Layton 1971; Mead 1980; 
Unger 1994; Badaracco Jr. 1995; Nissenbaum 2002; Roger A. Pielke 2007). Due to the 
exportation and out-sourcing of technological labor and expertise via globalization, there 
is unprecedented demand in less industrialized countries for engineers with advanced 
degrees, and for Western science and engineering education programs. Finally, because 
engineering ethics is a more recent field of knowledge than the ethics of other organized 
professions, much remains to debate about the nature of engineering and the 
responsibilities of engineers. These circumstances carry unique ethical challenges.  To 
be able to answer important ethical questions, it is essential first to define what the 
responsibilities of engineers are. 
 
Current literature recognizes a number of challenges in defining engineers’ 
responsibilities.   Deborah Johnson claims that applied moral theories have yet to reveal 
what social responsibilities engineers have specifically as engineers (Johnson 1992).  
Similarly, other authors have recognized various problems in the use of maxims from 
moral philosophy as guides to defining the responsibilities of engineers (Busby and 
Coeckelbergh 2003; Bowen 2010).  Neelke Doorn and Michael Davis have introduced 
philosophical models of responsibility to engineering ethics, however they are not 
intended to identify what engineers’ responsibilities are (Doorn 2009; Davis 2010)  
Instead they describe the practical benefits that come from a better understanding of 
responsibility.  Finally, it is also common to emphasize those responsibilities which are 
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expected of professionals in general when discussing the responsibilities of engineers.  
This is how Charles Fleddermann arrives at the responsibilities to protect client 
confidentiality and to avoid conflicts of interest (Fleddermann 1999).  All of these 
approaches avoid the question of what responsibilities engineers have qua engineers. 
 
This paper defines the responsibilities of engineers by considering what constitutes the 
nature of engineering as a particular form of activity.  Specifically, this paper starts by 
asking this question: How can the responsibilities of engineers be explained by what we 
know of engineering work and the circumstances in which it takes place?  In order to 
answer this question, this paper examines the practice of engineering, drawing on the 
idea of practices developed by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and showing how the 
elements of a practice are important for finding and justifying the responsibilities of 
engineers.  This examination will help to explain how the responsibilities of engineers 
can be recognized and what those responsibilities are.  To demonstrate the contribution 
that knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers makes to engineering ethics, a case 
study is discussed at the end of the paper which deals with ethical questions in the 
discipline of structural engineering. 
 
After this introduction, this paper provides a more detailed look at how responsibility 
has been discussed in the field of engineering ethics.  Then this paper lays out the 
concepts Alasdair MacIntyre has used to explain the ethics of specific practices, also 
explaining how these concepts apply to engineering.  Next, this paper will provide an 
critical analysis of papers in the field of engineering ethics which apply MacIntyre’s 
work.  Following these points will be a section proposing what engineers might be 
responsible for and how this is justified.  Finally, circumstances surrounding the failure 
of the Sleipner A platform off the coast of Norway in 1991 will be discussed to 
demonstrate how the responsibilities of engineers can be derived from knowledge of the 
nature of engineering and its context.
  
 
3 
BACKGROUND 
 
This section provides a background on how responsibility has been discussed in 
engineering ethics and the definition of responsibility used in this paper. First, we 
summarize the literature on engineers’ responsibilities. Then, we provide the definition 
of responsibility adopted in this paper and discuss how this definition contributes to the 
goal of identifying the responsibilities of engineers. 
 
Responsibility itself is a complex subject and needs to be defined by any paper taking it 
to be its subject matter.  In engineering ethics and in moral philosophy, the term 
responsibility can have varying meanings and qualifications.  For example, some speak 
of responsibility as a form of  accountability, while others link it with conditions for 
blameworthiness (Fischer and Tognazzini 2011; Smith 2007; Doorn and Nihlén-
Fahlquist 2010; Doorn 2009; Watson 1996; Davis 2010). The requirements to prove an 
individual is responsible and what they can actually be responsible for are also variable. 
Each usage results in a different account of engineers’ responsibilities.  
 
In specifying the responsibilities of engineers and evaluating engineering conduct, 
different accounts also arise from the application of differing moral philosophies such as 
deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics to engineering problems. The 
differences between moral philosophies are openly acknowledged by a number of 
authors.  Busby and Coeckelbergh, for instance, note that there is a common perception 
that engineers make ethical decisions based upon utilitarian principles while the public 
tends to form their expectations of engineers along deontological lines (Busby and 
Coeckelbergh 2003). From this perspective, engineers see themselves as largely 
responsible for reducing quantifiable levels of risk and harm, while the public thinks that 
engineers are responsible for fulfilling strictly prescribed duties to society. Richard 
Bowen argues that the theories of consequentialism, contractualism, and deontology 
have specific disadvantages when instituted in the field of engineering ethics (Bowen 
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2010).  Bowen claims that consequentialism contains no provision for justice, 
contractualism limits ethical aspiration, and deontology’s dense philosophical foundation 
is too impenetrable for engineers.  
 
In the contemporary engineering ethics literature, authors often contrast social and 
technical responsibilities, and there is disagreement about which kind of responsibility 
should be prioritized. Carl Mitcham notes that American engineers in the 1960’s and 
1970’s criticized the technocratic movement of previous decades for its lack of social 
consciousness (Mitcham 1994). Mitcham’s observation highlights the difference 
between thinking that engineers are responsible for technological advancement only, as 
opposed to being responsible for the consequences that technology has for people. The 
difference between technical and social responsibilities is also an issue in readings such 
as the work of Bowen (Bowen 2010 p. 135-6). Bowen points to two problems with an 
overemphasis on technical progress. First, he claims that much energy, including 
economic resources and time, is spent on the development of technologies, such as 
weaponry, that he argues do not benefit society. Second, Bowen points out that even 
established engineering technologies, such as water sanitation, are not available to 
everyone who needs them. Bowen concludes that engineers should work to correct the 
imbalance between technological ability and social need by prioritizing people. 
However, it is unclear whether the responsibility should be one belonging directly to 
engineers or if society should be responsible for resource allocation and support so that 
engineers can work toward such priorities. Also, it is hardly explicit in any paper that 
takes up these differences what exactly differentiates technical responsibilities from 
social responsibilities.  
 
There is also much debate about the extent to which engineers have the responsibility to 
contribute to the betterment of society. There are those authors who base the 
responsibility to benefit society upon aspirational ethics, appeals to codes of engineering 
ethics calling engineers to “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public,” 
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or duties of professionalism (Nichols and Weldon 1997; Bowen 2010; Davis 1997; 
Harris 2008; Pritchard 1998, 2001; NSPE 2007). There is also a contrary, though less 
popular, view. From this perspective, James Stieb claims that the responsibilities of 
engineers ought to be limited to the realm of professional competence, committing 
engineers only to the responsibility of avoiding harm to others while absolving engineers 
of the commonly accepted responsibility to benefit humanity (Stieb 2011).  As with the 
difference between the technical and social responsibilities, this disagreement between 
an obligation to avoid harm or to benefit society depends upon where one chooses to 
draw the line between harmless and beneficial technologies.  
 
By contrast with the above approaches, this paper focuses on the responsibilities of 
engineers qua engineers, where that refers to the duties acquired in virtue of being a 
member of a group.  This definition captures how a number of theorists think of ethics in 
general. Carl Skooglund states that ethics concerns “how we agree to relate to one 
another (in Nichols and Weldon 1997). Michael Davis refers to ethics as “those (morally 
permissible) standards of conduct (rules, principles, or ideals) that apply to members of a 
group simply because they are members of that group (Davis 2011).” These theorists 
capture what we are concerned with: the responsibilities that a person has specifically as 
a member of a discipline or group. What we mean by the responsibilities of engineers 
will have to do with how engineers adhere to the standards and methods set for 
engineering by society and engineers.  This approach allows us to specify 
responsibilities of engineers prior to evaluating whether those responsibilities are 
utilitarian, deontological, social, technical, aspirational, or otherwise.  It is also neutral at 
the outset between whether this should include technical and/or social duties. 
 
The claims that this paper makes regarding the responsibilities of engineers will only be 
as good as the account that we can make of engineers and the way they work. It is 
important to underscore the act of making an account of some organized activity for two 
reasons. If two criticisms of engineering are compared, the one that will be most credible 
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is the one that makes the most insightful account of engineering practice. The second 
important reason follows the first. Understanding the relationship between an activity 
and credible responsibility ascriptions will help explain the importance of three concepts 
used by Alasdair MacIntyre. These are the concepts of tradition, narrativity, and 
intelligibility. The main point we are making here is that an account of engineering is 
required in order to formulate what can be expected from engineers. The strength of such 
account directly influences the legitimacy of responsibility ascriptions. 
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PRACTICES 
 
Before using the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre to clarify the responsibilities of 
engineers, concepts from MacIntyre’s philosophy need to be defined. In this section, we 
focus on practices, before going on to consider goods, standards of excellence, and 
traditions in the next sections.  
 
MacIntyre defines a practice as: 
 
...any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the 
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (MacIntyre 1984a 
p. 187). 
 
In other words, a practice is a socially organized activity that exists by means of 
relationships between society members. There are goods that practitioners receive as a 
result of attempting to achieve excellence in their practice. These goods are internal 
because they can only be achieved by engaging in the practice. Counter to these, 
MacIntyre notes the existence of external goods such as money and fame which might 
come from a practice but can be earned in a number of other ways. As practitioners work 
to achieve and maintain those standards which constitute excellence for the their 
practice, not only do they obtain certain goods, but the practice evolves. The 
achievements and goals of the practice are refined. Adding numbers is not a practice 
because it is not socially established, the act of doing so has no history, and the act has 
no changing conceptions of excellence. Mathematics is however a practice because the 
activity has its own standards of excellence which mathematicians regularly attempt to 
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achieve and improve upon.  Mathematics also has a lively social history marked by the 
sharing and building up of ideas in university math departments, in journals, and in 
research. All of this activity amounts to a systematic extension of what mathematics is 
useful for and the goods that mathematicians gain from doing mathematics. 
 
MacIntyre gives a fundamental role to the concept of practices within his moral 
philosophy because of their predominance in human civilization around the world and 
throughout history. All places and times that have had their own societies have had their 
own practices. By making practices central to moral philosophy, MacIntyre is making a 
case for universal claims that do not contradict what might be morally appropriate for 
one place in time but not another.
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GOODS AND STANDARDS 
 
MacIntyre claims that practices are partially defined by their standards of excellence, 
and it is apparent from his definition that practices are closely linked to various types of 
goods as well. By taking a closer look at these concepts, we are building upon the basic 
concept of a practice as MacIntyre does. Most importantly we are establishing some 
guides to determining what practitioners are responsible for. In this section, we define 
the concepts of internal goods, external goods, and standards of excellence and put them 
into the context of an example taken from MacIntyre. 
 
Internal goods are those goods which by definition are obtained by practitioners as they 
attempt to achieve the standards of excellence in their practice (MacIntyre 1984a pp. 
188-90). They are specific to a practice and can only be had as a result of participating in 
that practice (MacIntyre 1984a p. 188). The fact that internal goods cannot be achieved 
without engaging in a practice means that they are best understood and explained by 
those with experience in the practice (MacIntyre 1984app. 188-89). Most importantly, 
internal goods serve as reasons for “trying to excel in whatever way the [practice] 
demands (MacIntyre 1984a p. 188).” Participating in order to excel and earn the internal 
goods is the moral requirement of MacIntyre’s concept of practices.  
 
External goods are those goods which can be earned in variable ways and do not need to 
be associated with any particular practice to be understood. These goods are typically 
money, status, and prestige (MacIntyre 1984a p. 188). Participation in a practice in order 
to obtain solely external goods is not a means for enriching society, furthering the 
practice or finding the good life for one’s self. In order to see this better, we can ask 
ourselves what it would be like to live in a society where external goods prevail. This 
would be a society fraught with inequality and competitiveness, because external goods 
are limited in supply (MacIntyre 1984a p. 196). The more one person has, the less there 
are for others (MacIntyre 1984a pp. 190-1). It follows then that placing the external 
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goods as the sole impetus for engaging in a practice can have negative consequences 
such as inequality or, as Dennis Randolph notes, economic instability and waste 
(Randolph 1992). This idea reinforces the fact that pursuing the internal goods and 
excellence in a practice is to participate for the correct reasons. 
 
Standards of excellence are authoritative ideals by which the work of practitioners are 
judged (MacIntyre 1984a p. 190). They must be accepted as authoritative if one is to 
work towards achieving and improving them. MacIntyre says that “we cannot be 
initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so 
far (MacIntyre 1984a p. 190)” It is important to note here that MacIntyre is referring to 
participation in a practice, not just engaging in a random act or skill which does not 
qualify as a practice. Actions such as skills may not require the acceptance of 
prerequisite standards of excellence because they are not sustained by a process of 
extending any particular set of ends, goods, and standards.   
 
Both internal goods and standards of excellence, as elements which define a practice, are 
perpetually open to revision and debate as new ideals are established (MacIntyre 1984a 
pp. 190, 221-2). One way that we suggest this can be recognized is when the practice is 
faced with a set of problems. Problems in the practice invariably arise, and it is the 
activity of practitioners to solve those problems. In doing so, they find new means, set 
new standards and define new ends for the practice (MacIntyre 1984b p. 36-7; 1984a p. 
190). This is precisely how practices sustain themselves and forge histories. It is the 
reason there is a difference between what was accepted as good in the past and what is 
good today.  However, the standards of excellence and internal goods of some practice 
in a particular time and place are necessary for defining that era of practice.  
 
The standard example MacIntyre provides to explain the relationship between goods, a 
practice, and excellence is that of a young chess player (MacIntyre 1984a; Bowen 2010; 
van der Burg and van Gorp 2005). However, for purposes of understanding the goods 
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and standards of excellence of a profession, a more appropriate example to consider is 
MacIntyre’s example of 18th century European portraiture. 
 
MacIntyre explains how one can understand the standards of excellence that defined this 
genre of painting. In earlier centuries, two standards had defined two prior genres from 
which the contemporary genre evolved. The first MacIntyre identifies as the painting of 
religious iconography, particularly depictions of the face of Christ (MacIntyre 1984a p. 
189). What mattered in this genre was not how real the subject matter appeared, but the 
power of the composition to convey an idea or narrative to the viewer. The second genre, 
realism, came later and was dependent upon the painters’ ability to render the faces of 
people so that portraits relayed in fine detail what their subjects looked like. The painting 
of iconography involved relaying meaning while realism involved a precise depiction of 
visual reality. The standard of excellence that defines 18th century European portraiture 
achieved a symbiosis of the two excellences. Individuals were painted with all of the 
detail of realism, however they were rendered in such a way as to reveal some 
underlying truth or commentary about the subject (MacIntyre 1984a p. 189). MacIntyre 
says that the painters of this genre were able to paint their subjects not just as they 
appeared to the eye, but as they deserved to be painted. The objective to render reality in 
such a way as to reveal a greater truth is the standard of excellence which defined 18th 
century European portraiture.  
 
MacIntyre goes on to propose two internal goods of 18th century European portraiture. 
First, he posits as the internal good of the practice “excellence in performance by the 
painters and that of each portrait itself (MacIntyre 1984a p. 189).” The key to 
understanding this statement is to grasp that MacIntyre means the goods come in the 
form of accomplishments as one excels beyond current “types and modes of excellence 
(MacIntyre 1984a p. 189).” Performance means to combine technical precision with the 
ability to accentuate the character of the subjects of their portraiture. The portraits 
themselves were internal goods realized not just by the artist but also the “whole 
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community who participate in the practice (MacIntyre 1984a p. 190-1)”.  In trying to 
meet the standards of excellence governing their practice artists developed the ability to 
render truth through painting in a way not done before. The progress both in the abilities 
of the painters and the masterworks they produced are the internal goods of this genre of 
painting. 
 
Alongside these excellences in performance and products, there is the internal good of 
living the life of a painter. MacIntyre says, “it is the painter’s living out of a greater or 
lesser part of his or her life as a painter that is the second kind of good internal to 
painting (MacIntyre 1984a p. 190).” This does not mean that the internal good of being a 
painter is prestige or social status (MacIntyre 1984a p. 189). Instead, in the process of 
pursuing excellence in painting, painters are absorbed in their work in such a way that it 
becomes a part of their identity. MacIntyre’s position is that we derive our identity from 
the roles we occupy, so that finding what is good for us is directly related to the internal 
good of having a role in a practice. 
 
This example of 18th century European portraiture, shows exactly how a practice is 
defined by those internal goods and standards of excellence which have evolved from 
previous goods and standards. This is an important point because the history of a 
practice is constituted exactly by the process of arguing, revising, and improving that 
practice’s internal goods and standards of excellence (MacIntyre 1984a p. 221-2). This 
point will be taken up more earnestly in the following section on tradition. 
 
So far, this paper finds that internal goods, participation in practices, and standards of 
excellence are the foundations of what practitioners should be doing and thus are 
responsible for. By understanding internal goods and standards of excellence as 
MacIntyre does, we can make an initial statement about these responsibilities. First, 
practitioners are responsible for knowing the standards of excellence of their practice. 
This means knowing them sufficiently so that one can submit to their authority as one 
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learns a practice. It also means knowing them as one practices so that they can be 
followed and improved upon. Perhaps not all practitioners will have the chance or ability 
to greatly further the standards of excellence of their practice, but all must contribute. 
This is why knowing them and adhering to them are important, because this course of 
action does indeed contribute to a collective attempt to progress the practice. Second, 
practitioners are responsible for engaging in the practice for the right reasons. These 
reasons are the internal goods of the practice. Based upon what we have learned from 
MacIntyre so far, we can say that practitioners are responsible for knowing, maintaining, 
and improving the standards of excellence of a practice. They are also responsible for 
contributing to the health of the practice by pursuing its internal goods. 
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TRADITIONS 
 
MacIntyre’s concept of tradition helps to determine the responsibilities of members of 
practices, particularly members of professions such as engineering, because such 
practices have long histories over which present obligations have developed. The 
concept of tradition encourages us to view these responsibilities from a historical and 
more broad social perspective. In this section, MacIntyre’s definition of the concept of 
tradition will be defined and examined for the way that it helps us to better define the 
responsibilities of members of a practice. 
 
Before defining what MacIntyre means by a tradition, it will be helpful to understand 
how he says a narrative of peoples’ circumstances makes their actions intelligible. 
MacIntyre’s philosophy relies heavily on the idea that all human actions take place 
within larger stories that we tell to ourselves and others in order to make sense of those 
actions. The example MacIntyre provides involves a person working in a garden 
(MacIntyre 1984a p. 206). There are many ways that a gardener’s actions can be 
interpreted. One way is to understand that the gardener’s intention is to exercise and 
gardening is one such way to do it. Another is to see that the gardener’s intention is to 
prepare the garden for winter. Another is to see that the gardener is merely trying to 
please a spouse. All of these different ways of interpreting the actions of the gardener 
depend upon the gardener’s relationship with different social and historical contexts that 
take the form of narratives. If pleasing the spouse is important there will be a narrative of 
the gardener’s marriage which explains why this is so. The need for exercise will be 
explained by a different story. Preparing the garden for winter may be important because 
the history of the gardening on a European farm has shown that this is the best practice 
of gardening. This is yet another narrative. MacIntyre uses this example to explain how 
what we do, our behaviors and intentions, rely on the context provided to them by a 
narrative. The narrative is required in order to make sense of our actions, that is to make 
them intelligible. 
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After establishing narrative as the way of making our actions intelligible, MacIntyre 
introduces his concept of tradition. MacIntyre defines tradition in the following terms: 
A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute the tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends 
through generations sometimes through many generations. Hence the 
individual’s search for his or her good is generally and characteristically 
conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the 
individual’s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are 
internal to practices and of the goods of a single life (MacIntyre 1984a p. 
222).  
 A tradition is a historically extended process of collectively reasoning what defines the 
good or goods of a particular social setting. All individuals live their lives and all 
practices exist within the longer histories of these traditions. What is an internal good 
today or what an individual finds to define their life as good will be influenced by 
conceptions of goods which have been previously determined by past members of a 
practice or other relevant social body.  
 
It is apparent from MacIntyre’s definition of traditions, that a tradition can be the history 
of a practice. In MacIntyre’s words, “practices always have histories and that at any 
given moment what a practice is depends upon a mode of understanding it which has 
been transmitted often through many generations (MacIntyre 1984a p. 221).” This 
transmission is part of the narrative of a practice and understanding the present practice 
by knowing its history is how it becomes intelligible (MacIntyre 1984a p. 222). So, what 
we know about a practice in the present depends upon what has been transmitted through 
the practice’s history. Therefore, our understanding of a practice depends upon what we 
know of its history. These are the reasons that looking at the tradition of a practice is 
important. 
  
 
16 
Practices become traditions through their activity of progress and change. Practices, by 
MacIntyre’s definition, involve extending our notions of “excellence and the ends and 
goods involved”.  One way that this extension occurs is as a result of a debate amongst 
practitioners concerning what is best for the practice (MacIntyre 1984a p. 222). This 
debate over the good for a practice includes the intention to make progress in the areas 
of excellences, ends and goods. When this debate occurs over time, a tradition is formed. 
First we noted that a practice is defined by its standards of excellence and its internal 
goods. Now, we are adding that these aspects of the practice evolve over time by means 
of the argumentation MacIntyre associates with traditions. 
 
The concept of tradition allows us to make a distinction between goods such as those 
internal to practices and the good that MacIntyre also frequently refers to.  First, there is 
what MacIntyre refers to as the good of an individual life. This good is whatever answer 
satisfies the question of how one is to best live one’s entire life from beginning to end 
(MacIntyre 1984a p. 218).  Part of this answer comes from asking what constitutes the 
good life for someone who occupies the same social role (MacIntyre 1984a p. 220). This 
good is not only defined by those people who share a similar place and time but also 
those predecessors from which a person inherits a tradition. This means that what 
defines a good life for those who immediately precede us in our practices sets our “moral 
starting point (MacIntyre 1984a p. 220).” We learn from their standards of excellence, 
inherit their responsibilities, and begin our own search for the good from what 
constituted the good for them. 
 
The inheritance of a conception of good is only a starting point and what follows is a 
further search for what constitutes a good life in present circumstances. MacIntyre refers 
to this search as a quest, directly associating the word quest with an attempt to answer 
the question of what it means to lead a good life (MacIntyre 1984a p. 219). Part of this 
answer involves seeking the internal goods of practices. However, the answer to this 
question is not predetermined but includes a measure of unpredictability. This allows for 
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the fact that during the course of searching for the good, whether it be the good for an 
individual or the goods of a practice, conflicts are bound to present themselves. For this 
thesis it is important to recognize that these troubles appear within practices as problems. 
As challenges are faced and overcome in the course of living out our lives and practices 
we arrive at new conceptions of good.  
 
Knowledge of this process contributes to our account of what we ought to do today and 
what might be possible for the future. First one inherits responsibilities, standards of 
excellence, and conceptions of both goods and the good from our predecessors so that 
we have a place to start. This is the fundamental importance of tradition. Then, as one 
participates in a practice by achieving and advancing its standards of excellence what 
defines those standards evolves. As a result, the goals and goods of our practices and 
lives are extended. We propose that this process also includes inheriting problems, 
solving those problems, and forming new problems which are passed on to future 
practitioners. MacIntyre makes reference to the role of tradition in this process by 
saying, “that an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of future 
possibilities which the past has made to the present (MacIntyre 1984a p. 223).” If it is 
true that the present state of a practice is embedded in a longer tradition of its 
development, then we find ourselves in the middle of a narrative as it is being written 
(MacIntyre 1984a). It follows that if the future is to ever be intelligible, and we have no 
real reason to think otherwise, then establishing the future good will depend upon how 
well we structure our present quest for the good today. 
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RESPONSIBILITY 
 
We can derive the responsibilities of practitioners from MacIntyre’s philosophy be 
looking closely at the relationship between the system he has laid out and the question of 
what one ought to do. In previous sections, this thesis made some initial statements 
about the responsibility to know, maintain, and advance standards of excellence. It also 
noted that responsibility today is inherited from past practitioners in a way that does not 
disregard future responsibilities. In this section, these statements will be organized and 
expanded upon in light of what MacIntyre says specifically about our duties.  
 
Initially, we said that a practitioner is responsible for three things in relation to the 
relevant standards of excellence in their practice. The three responsibilities associated 
with standards of excellence are: 
1.  Learning the current standards of excellence defining the practice. 
2.  Maintaining adherence to those standards of excellence as one engages in 
the practice. 
3. Advancing the standards of excellence by identifying and solving 
problems faced by the practice. 
 
MacIntyre’s concept of tradition encourages us to also view responsibility as an 
obligation that is inherited from past practitioners and passed on in modified form to 
future practitioners. In the previous section we stated that practitioners do inherit 
problems, solve them, and formulate new ones to be passed on. This is one way that 
responsibilities can be derived from the concept tradition. Two relevant responsibilities 
are:  
 
4.  Practitioners are responsible for working on the problems inherited from 
the past. 
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5.  Practitioners are responsible for clarifying problems for the present and 
future. 
We also said that practitioners ought to engage in their practice for the right reasons. 
This statement can be taken as a responsibility because what we ought to do as 
practitioners translates into our duties. The reason that practitioners should engage in 
their practice is to achieve and advance the internal goods of the practice. This does not 
mean that external goods are not important. In MacIntyre’s philosophy, external goods 
are largely managed by institutions which do generally serve in support of practices. So, 
practices and institutions, as well as internal and external goods, are closely linked. 
However, the reasons for deciding one course of action over another when acting on 
behalf of an institution or on behalf of a practice, often conflict. This paper agrees with 
MacIntyre that the motivation to participate in a practice ought to be to pursue the 
internal goods. It also agrees that external goods are necessary to the life of institutions 
and, by extension, practices.  The question is how to articulate this point in terms of a 
responsibility. We formulate such a responsibility by saying: 
6.  Practitioners are responsible for making decisions in their work based 
upon the understanding that the quest for external goods and power of 
institutions must be tempered with an emphasis on the internal goods of 
practices.  
The final responsibility that this paper finds important is derived from the fact that our 
behaviors and the intentions behind them require a narrative account in order to make 
sense. Having an accurate account about why a person behaved in a certain way, 
particularly one that shows them furthering goods and standards of one tradition rather 
than another, is valuable for those people who must place blame. In other words, the 
prerequisite for judgment about whether a person is responsible or not needs to reference 
a narrative of their behavior (MacIntyre 1984a p. 218). However, this idea works in 
reverse as well, because it is reasonable to expect that an actor be able to provide their 
own account of their behaviors and intentions (MacIntyre 1984a pp. 209, 217-8). This is 
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to say that people should be accountable in the sense that they can put their actions into 
the context of a narrative that explains why they acted in the way they did. In formal 
terms the relevant responsibility can be stated as: 
7.  Practitioners are responsible for maintaining an account of their 
behavior, decisions, and intentions. 
This obligation makes a valuable contribution to the overall framework of responsibility. 
First, the ability to put actions into narrative explanations of them is an extension of the 
moral agency required by many philosophers setting prerequisite standards of 
responsibility and blameworthiness. To make an adequate account of our behaviors in 
moral terms fulfills the prerequisite because it requires moral competence to do so. If 
this is to be done in terms of goods and standards, then the practitioners must posses an 
understanding of the roles goods and standards play in morality and their work. Second, 
in many areas of life we will be called on by others of authority or victims of harm to 
explain our behaviors. When the actions of a practice effect others, one can judge from 
such accounts the intentions of practitioners and more precisely, the transgressions in 
question. These questions precede decisions as to what level of blame can be 
administered to practitioners. Third, when a practitioner makes an intelligible account of 
their actions for other practitioners, this account contributes to the furthering of the 
practice. This is one way knowledge can be shared within the practice and goods and 
standards furthered as a result. For these reasons, it is fair to say that people are 
responsible for maintaining and being prepared to offer, when justified by authority or 
harm, a narrative account of their actions.
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ENGINEERING AS PRACTICE 
 
In order to determine the responsibilities of engineers along the lines previously 
discussed, this paper takes a closer look at what qualifies engineering as a practice and 
what relevant standards and goods it posseses. It is important to be specific about the 
particular branch of engineering we are referring to for the same reason MacIntyre 
singled out 18th century European portraiture in his writing on practices. This reason is 
that different types of pracitces in different eras are likely to have different histories and 
standards and thus have different responsiblities. This paper will look at the 
responsiblities of structural engineers in the past several decades with two objectives in 
mind. First, how engineering qualifies as a practice will be discussed. Then, several 
components of the practice of structural engineering will be examined for the way they 
demonstrate how responsibilities can be derived from practice standards of excellence 
and internal goods. Though there are many ways a practice such as structural 
engineering can be discussed in MacIntyre’s terms, this paper will focus upon standards 
of excellence and internal goods because these are directly applicable to the daily 
pracitce of structural engineering. 
 
To begin, engineering qualifies as a practice according to MacIntyre’s definition because 
it is a cooperative activity defined by standards of excellence which, when pursued, 
results in internal goods and an extension of the ends involved (Bowen 2010; Martin 
2002; van der Burg and van Gorp 2005). Engineering is cooperative and socially 
established, meaning that the engineering profession exists by means of relationships 
between engineers who work together to maintain and improve the practice.      Imagine 
just how engineering would appear if what we thought engineering to be was entirely 
independent of the contributions of people working to improve upon each other’s ideas 
over the course of history. Engineering also has its own clearly defined standards of 
excellence. When these standards are followed, in an improvement of the ends of 
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engineering practice are achieved and extended. These points about engineering in 
general are also true for the practice of structural engineering specifically.  
 
One immediate source of standards governing the practice of structural engineering are 
the practice’s technical codes. Technical codes serve as guidelines governing structural 
design in the materials of concrete, wood, and steel. Technical codes specify dimensions 
and grades of materials, so that safety and performance can be achieved in commonly 
encountered situations. For instance, technical codes tell us the number of nails required 
to join two pieces of lumber in prescribed configurations. They also tell us the lightest 
steel beam available for a particular case of loading so that material is saved and strength 
is ensured. Concrete codes dictate how much steel reinforcing is necessary to avoid 
sudden failure of structures or how much concrete coverage should be maintained 
around reinforcement to ensure longevity. Most often in engineering ethics, emphasis is 
placed upon the codes of ethical conduct publishing by professional engineering 
societies. Often quoted are the rules to ‘hold paramount the health, safety, and welfare of 
the public’ or ‘to protect client confidentiality (NSPE 2007).’ Though there is much 
discussion about these ethical codes in papers on the responsibilities of engineers, this 
thesis takes lesser discussed, technical codes used in engineering as equally relevant 
standards for the topic of responsibility. Three reasons this is so are that the technical 
codes change in sync with evolution of the practice, they are the direct result of daily 
activities, such as research and design on the part of engineers in cooperation with each 
other, and they are unique to engineering in a way that the ethical codes are not. 
 
As an example, one can look to the American Institute of Steel Construction’s 
Specification for Structural Steel Buildings (American Institute of Steel Construction. 
2010). The specification’s preface reveals that this design guide  
is the result of the consensus deliberations of a committee of structural 
engineers with wide experience and high professional standing, representing 
a wide geographical distribution throughout the United States. The 
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committee includes approximately equal numbers of engineers in private 
practice and code agencies, engineers involved in research and teaching, and 
engineers employed by steel fabricating and producing companies 
(American Institute of Steel Construction. 2010 p. 16.1-v). 
This work is developed and approved by an identifiable body of structural engineers. It 
is the result of social cooperation in engineering. The code is “based upon past 
successful usage, advances in the state of knowledge, and changes in design practice 
(American Institute of Steel Construction. 2010 p. 16.1-v).” This is precisely how 
standards should evolve if engineering is a practice according to MacIntyre’s definition. 
The most recent version of the code gives priority to contemporary methods of structural 
design such as the direct analysis method. This method takes into account second-order 
loading effects on steel structures making them more efficient, stable, and safe. The 
direct analysis method is made possible by the widespread use of computer analysis 
tools, and it represents the current standard of practice in structural engineering within 
the United States. It is the development, maintenance, refinement, and authority of such 
codes that qualify them as standards in the terms MacIntyre associates with practices. 
 
So far, we have refrained from using the term excellence to describe technical codes as 
standards. Perhaps the strongest point that justifies these standards as standards of 
excellence according to MacIntyre stems from understanding standards of excellence as 
those standards which have excelled historically (MacIntyre 1984a p. 189). It still could 
be argued that these authoritative and formal  standards serve only as minimum 
standards. However, as with the AISC Specification, current codes reflect the current 
state of knowledge and methodologies in the practice. Furthermore, they attempt to 
strike an ideal balance between a number of design criteria such as safety and efficiency. 
Consider an instance when a beam is being designed for a building. Though, a different 
size beam may work, the probabilities used to develop the recommendations contained 
in the specification ensure a high degree of safety balanced with an attentiveness to 
efficiency. A stronger beam may offer a greater sense of safety though it would be 
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unnecessarily strong. A weaker beam may work some of the time, or for a limited time, 
or provide strength but result in undesirable deflections and vibrations. The code offers a 
way to strike the appropriate balance between the two. Thus the term minimal is 
misleading because we are talking about an outcome involving multiple variables.  
 
There are also ideals in engineering practice upon which technical codes are founded and 
more importantly serve as guides for circumstances in which the technical codes are 
insufficient. These  ideals are the abstract models of physical phenomenon which 
engineers develop and use to predict the behavior of their designs. The practical use of 
scientific or mathematic models to predict the behavior of physical materials is a unique 
activity and hallmark of engineering. It is what Mitcham refers to as engineering’s 
“‘internal’ trait of modeling (Mitcham 1994 p. 162).” These models are understood to 
give the most accurate available prediction of material behavior under prescribed 
conditions. The most contemporary, accurate, efficient, or appropriate methods of 
solving an engineering problem depend on the progressive evolution of these models. 
One example of the progress of such activity in structural engineering, is the 
transformation from one theory of how to judge the strength of a beam to another. The 
17th century produced Galilean rules of thumb directing that beams be loaded along their 
narrow side (Timoshenko 1983). Then came Hooke’s explanation of the relationship 
between material strength and deformation. In the early 19th century, Navier showed 
how theories of elasticity could be used to solve indeterminate beam problems. Shortly 
after, Cauchy developed a mathematically rigorous model of elastic behavior.  With the 
advent of computers in the 20th century, the most modern methods of strength 
determination in beams have been incorporated into software programs doing finite 
element calculations.  
 
The previously mentioned standards of excellence in structural engineering exist to aid 
in the achievement of particular, evolving goals of design and research. In MacIntyre’s 
writings, it is not always easy to make a clear distinction between what is an internal 
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good and what he sometimes refers to as the ends of a practice. It could be argued that 
internal goods are ends realized by practitioners. It could also be argued that internal 
goods not only benefit practitioners but exist as goods everyone benefits from (Martin 
2002). What follows is a discussion of several goals of structural engineering which can 
be construed as internal goods or ends but regardless, can be related to responsibilities. 
 
There are a number of ideal outcomes which measure the success of a structural 
engineering project.  These goals are plausible candidates for internal goods in the way 
that the performance and products of painters were in MacIntyre’s previous example. In 
ancient civilizations, early engineers were responsible for ensuring a prescribed result 
such as building a monument or constructing an irrigation system. This seemed to be the 
goal regardless of the human cost of construction and experimental, full-scale failures 
(Wells 2010). As engineering knowledge progressed and the demands of society became 
more intricate, the outcomes of engineering work have taken on more clearly defined 
requirements. In the past several centuries, adequate strength and efficiency of 
geometries and materials have become outcomes more avidly pursued by means of 
increasingly specialized knowledge.  Serviceability and stability are also now 
requirements of comparable importance. Safety, not only for end users of structured 
objects but also for people involved in building and manufacture is also an important 
consideration.  In more recent decades, sustainability in structural engineering has 
become a conscious goal, particularly for those structural engineers involved in areas of 
structural health monitoring, diagnostics, and rehabilitation. Though some of these ends 
are more recent additions to the goals of structural engineering than others, the aims of 
strength, stability, serviceability, safety, and sustainability are ends or goods which 
contemporary structural engineers adopt for themselves and work to achieve. They are 
ideals structural engineers are responsible for pursuing.  
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The standards of excellence and goals of structural engineering determine what 
structural engineers are responsible for in the terms laid out by this paper. They can be 
summarized in the following way: 
 
1. Structural engineers have the responsibility to know and follow current 
technical codes of structural engineering practice.  
2. Structural engineers are responsible for using the best abstract 
mathematical and scientific models currently available. This requires 
knowledge of the current state of design theory, mathematics, and material 
behavior. To know these models is to both better understand the codes and 
to have methods to solve problems for which the code makes no 
recommendation. 
3. Structural engineers are also responsible for participating in the process of 
excelling practice standards such as models and codes. As this paper stated 
before, this does not mean that every structural engineer should have a 
direct role in revolutionizing current standards of excellence. What it does 
mean is that all should use the current standards appropriately, where 
necessary note insufficiencies, and where possible contribute to their 
improvement.  
4.  It is the responsibility of structural engineers to articulate problems in the 
practice and work towards solving them. This responsibility applies to 
individual engineering projects such as buildings as well as to large scale 
research projects with broad impacts on the way engineering is done. 
5. Structural engineers have a responsibility to understand and achieve the 
necessary outcomes of a project as expected by authorities such as clients, 
the law, and end users. These outcomes, or internal goods as we called 
them include strength, sustainability, safety, stability, and serviceability.  
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There are other responsibilities mentioned in the previous section which are also 
applicable to structural engineering, although an extensive discussion of them lies 
outside the scope of this paper. The first responsibility regards what MacIntyre said 
about the life of a painter being an internal good of painting. Ethicists have noted that 
collective support and autonomy are important components of responsible behavior in 
the professions. These components require the support of cohesive community of 
engineers. Thus, we should consider what it means to live the life of an engineer and to 
be a part of a community of engineers. By taking these things to be internal goods, issues 
of collective support and professional autonomy can be placed as goals of engineering. 
The relevant responsibility for structural engineers can be stated thus: 
 
6. Structural engineers are responsible for participating in a community of 
structural engineers which supports the profession as a whole. 
 
There are a number of ways engineers can strengthen their community of 
engineering practitioners. Larry May mentions that professional engineering 
societies might perform this function (May 1996 p.117-122). Engineers can 
participate in conferences, publish papers in professional journals, mentor other 
engineers, and share their perspectives on their work and the work of their 
contemporaries. In cases such as whistle blowing, they can offer support to their 
colleagues.  
 
The next and final responsibility has to do with what MacIntyre has said about putting 
our actions in narrative form so that ourselves and others can make proper sense of them. 
For engineers the relevant responsibility can be stated as: 
 
7. Structural engineers have the responsibility to make an account of the 
relationship between their decision made in the course of their work and 
standards of excellence and goods  of structural engineering.  
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To make such an account, a structural engineer must be conscious of these elements, 
and any account given will serve as a narrative making the intentions of the engineer 
intelligible. One way this is commonly done in practice is by taking notes of research 
and design processes. Careful documentation of information and decision making is 
a responsibility which many engineers already fulfill. Engineers also write books and 
articles containing similar narratives of their work. Now, these actions have a 
philosophical basis that makes account making a responsibility. Though these 
accounts are not rightly available to anyone who might request them, they are 
important in a number of instances. In actions leading to legal disputes, a narrative of 
the intentions of structural engineers can be very important. Engineers who fulfill the 
responsibility to explain their work in terms of standards of excellence and goods 
also make a contribution to the previous responsibility to participate in the 
establishment of an engineering community. Their may be other instances where 
clients or victims of harm are entitled to such an account. 
 
The responsibilities of structural engineers which this paper proposes have been derived 
from the concepts adopted from MacIntyre. They reflect an attempt to recognize a 
number of things structural engineers are responsible qua engineers. One benefit of 
looking at responsibility this way is that it is easy to see how the items on this list are 
interrelated. For instance, engineers who fulfill their responsibilities to achieve standards 
of excellence also achieve internal goods or desirable outcomes. Doing these things 
contributes to a fostering of community and the knowledge necessary to make a moral 
account of the engineers’ own actions. Both of these outcomes are responsibilities in 
themselves. In the following section this paper provides a case study to better 
demonstrate how these responsibilities may or may not be fulfilled in actual practice. 
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THE SLEIPNER A CONDEEP PLATFORM ACCIDENT 
 
The failure and loss of the Sleipner A offshore platform in 1991 provides us with an 
opportunity to examine, in practice, the responsibilities we have previously ascribed to 
structural engineers. First, this case study incorporates the use of technical codes 
governing off-shore structures as well as the use of sophisticated structural analysis 
methods. Second, how the accident has been interpreted by engineers, investigators, and 
ethicists reveals the role and importance of narrative account making in engineering 
work. What follows is a brief description of the accident and a more detailed look at the 
facts of the situation as they pertain to the previously ascribed responsibilities of 
structural engineers.  
 
The Sleipner A platform was a condeep, gravity base type offshore petroleum extraction 
platform. Condeep platforms are made of concrete and stand tall from the ocean floor to 
surface. They are used  in the North Sea where conditions are harsh and petroleum may 
need to be stored within the platform structure during winter months (Wackers 2004; 
Michael Collins 1997). Gravity base structures (GBS’s) are designed so that the weight 
of the concrete is enough to resist the upward force of ocean water displaced by the 
structure when it is lowered to the bottom of the ocean. The Sleipner A platform was of 
moderate size compared to other condeep platforms in operation (Michael Collins 1997; 
Wackers 2004). It consisted of 24 concrete-walled cylinders, less than 80 meters high, 
and bundled together to appear like a honeycomb in plan (Holand 1994; Michael Collins 
1997). Each cylinder was 24 meters in diameter (Michael Collins 1997). It the interstices 
of the cylinders triangular void spaces were created, called tricells (Wackers 2004). In 
order to raise and lower the platform in the ocean, water levels in the cylinders were 
controlled through mechanical-pump ballasting. Water levels in the tricells were not able 
to be controlled in such a way. On August 23, 1991, the Sleipner platform was towed to 
deep water for a ballasting test prior to being put into operation weeks later (Holand 
1994; Michael Collins 1997; Wackers 2004). During submersion, a crash was heard and 
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the platform began to sink. Roughly 18 minutes later the platform disappeared into the 
ocean causing a magnitude 3.0 earthquake near the coast of Norway as it hit the ocean 
floor. All workers on board were evacuated so that there was no loss of life. 
 
Most accounts of the Sleipner accident emphasize the immediate causal and technical 
factors surrounding the loss of the platform. These accounts emphasis the fact that, once 
the pressure head difference between the water in the tricells and water in the cylinders 
reached roughly 65 meters, a crack developed between the two causing ballasting 
controls in the cylinders to fail. The strength of the walls between the two spaces was 
underestimated so that the walls could not withstand the loads caused by the pressure 
difference. Hypotheses of sinking scenarios, scale-tests, computer models, and full-scale 
model tests were all used during the post-accident investigation to conclude that a crack 
between tricell T23 and cylinder D3 caused the failure.1 There are two often cited 
reasons why the walls were insufficient. The first is that when finite element analysis 
was used to determine the required strength of the tricell wall, standard finite element 
modeling practices were not followed.  Design engineers allowed a computer model that 
incorporated skewed finite elements when it was known that such elements can produce 
inaccurate results (Holand 1994). This led to a 43% underestimation of the true shear 
strength required in the wall (Wackers 2004). At the same time, it was concluded that the 
proper size and placement of shear reinforcement, steel pieces known at T-bars, was 
insufficient. As this paper will claim, these two problems can be categorized as 
shortcomings in the areas of formal technical codes and abstract, analytical methods. 
 
                                                
1 Two independent investigative agencies came to the same conclusion. One 
investigation was conducted by Norwegian Contractors, the company who was under 
contract to design and build the Sleipner A platform. The other investigation was 
conducted by SINTEF at the request of Statoil who owned the lease for the off-shore 
field where the Sleipner platform was to be operated. 
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A few authors have written accounts of the accident which put the reasons the platform 
sank into the context of broader narratives. Collins et. al. have discussed the fact that 
concrete codes governing the design of off-shore concrete platforms in Norway were 
adopted from codes written by the American Concrete Institute (ACI) in the 1970s 
(Michael Collins 1997). According to the authors, it is known that these codes were 
insufficient for loading situations such as those which occurred in the tricell wall. The 
ACI code allowed for a reduction in shear reinforcement in concrete members subject to 
high compression loads. This allowance was a response to earlier structural failures 
where an opposite scenario occurred. Concrete members in tension were found to need 
more shear reinforcement than usual. The authors’ point is that it is not always 
appropriate to assume that compression, the opposite of tension, reduces the need for 
shear reinforcement. Other concrete construction codes in use at the time, such as the 
AASHTO code, do not make similar allowances. The authors show through laboratory 
analysis that if the AASHTO code had been followed, the tricell wall would have likely 
held. Wackers has written an account that puts the failure of the platform into the context 
of the economic and corporate constraints imposed upon the project. At the time, 
petroleum prices were low and the contractor, Norwegian Contractors, was attempting 
for the first time to do all of required the engineering analysis in-house. So, the market 
was contracting at the same time the company was expanding its capabilities. In order to 
achieve profitability, engineers at Norwegian Contractors focused on saving material 
costs by optimizing the design, thus making the platform walls as thin and lightly 
reinforced as possible. The accounts of Collins et. al. and Wackers attempt to explain the 
failure of the Sleipner platform in terms which extend beyond the previously mentioned 
mistakes in finite element analysis and reinforcement placement.  
 
Within these explanations of what caused the Sleipner platform to fail, there are issues 
related to the concepts which this paper has derived from MacIntyre’s moral philosophy.  
First, this paper has previously claimed that formal codes and analytical methods are 
standards of excellence in the practice of engineering. Specifically, the codes for 
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concrete construction which influenced the design of the Sleipner platform are 
candidates for scrutiny as codes of excellence in structural engineering. The method of 
finite element analysis for determining the stress on a structural object was, and is, one 
of the most advanced methods of analysis in structural engineering. Finite element 
analysis is a standard of excellence in current structural engineering practice. Second, 
the internal goods which this paper has previously recognized are central to the incident. 
Safety and strength are the most obvious goods in question. However, Wackers’ account 
involves another good which complicates the others. This good is optimization. Finally, 
we can see in the various perspectives and conclusions reached by investigators such as 
Collins et. al., Holand, and Wackers, that a narrative account of why the platform failed 
helps us to reach conclusions about what the engineers intentions and mistakes were. 
Holand suggests that the finite element methods used by the engineers were vulnerable 
to miscalculation. Collins et. al. focus upon the codes governing the project as the source 
of problems. Wackers claims that the engineers did the very best they could possibly do 
and that the platform failed because of the external constraints imposed upon the design 
team by their company, their dedication to the ideal of optimization, and the economic 
conditions of the time. Recognizing these three points helps us to sort out the 
responsibilities of structural engineers qua structural engineers. In the remainder of this 
section, this paper will focus on these three issues as the bases for responsibilities in 
structural engineering.  
 
In the terms ascribed by this paper, we can make a statement regarding what the 
engineers ought to have done or should do in similar situations. First there are those 
responsibilities which this paper has formed around knowledge and use of technical 
codes. Collins et. al have stated that the engineers at Norwegian Contractors followed 
the applicable Norwegian codes for concrete design. However, part of the failure of the 
Sleipner platform can be traced to the fact that the Norwegian codes were adopted from 
a version of the ACI code. The ACI code had a history of its own which led to its 
insufficiency under the particular circumstances in question, namely when a 
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compression member is subjected to high shear forces. It is the responsibility of 
engineers to understand that codes are adopted for common problems as the American 
Institute of Steel Construction’s Specification for Structural Steel Buildings states the 
“intention to provide design criteria for routine use and not to provide specific criteria 
for infrequently encountered problems, which occur in the full range of structural design 
(American Institute of Steel Construction. 2010 p.16.1-v).” It is also the responsibility of 
engineers to understand the source and history of technical codes. This brings us to our 
second responsibility. Structural engineers have the responsibility for understanding and 
working with the analytical models on which the codes are based. These models are also 
important for unusual instances where the codes are insufficient. Though engineers on 
the Sleipner platform design team did use the analytical methods of the time, finite 
element analysis, they failed to follow the finite element methods rigorously. The 
engineers used skewed shaped elements in their finite element model when standard 
practice recommended against this. This responsibility should have been higher 
prioritized because the Sleipner project was the first time Norwegian Contractors had 
conducted their own finite element analysis in-house (Wackers 2004). Though Wackers 
claims that the engineers on the project were doing the best job they could under the 
circumstances, this does not mean they were not responsible for the mistakes they made 
which led to the failure. Perhaps what it does mean is that when blame and liability were 
ascribed it was more appropriate to take action against the company, Norwegian 
Contractors, and not the individual engineers. Wackers’ point that the economic and 
corporate circumstances in which the engineers worked made it difficult for them to 
behave otherwise is a good one. This paper takes the position that this makes them no 
less candidates for responsibility ascriptions as structural engineers. It does make them 
less likely candidates for blame and financial liability.  
 
The Sleipner platform accident raises an interesting question about how structural 
engineers are responsible for internal goods or ends. In this instance, structural engineers 
were not able to ensure strength or safety. As Wackers points out, they were dedicated to 
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the internal good of optimization. However, it is clear that optimization cannot be 
considered an outcome of a structural engineering project where strength and safety are 
not achieved. These facts raise three questions. First, if internal goods conflict in such a 
way are they really internal goods? Second, are there internal goods in structural 
engineering, such as strength, which are more important than others? Lastly, would 
structural engineering be what it is if strength was an internal good but optimization was 
not? This paper takes the position that structural engineers are responsible for more than 
adequate strength and this includes optimization, which is the same as efficiency which 
this paper previously established as a good. These questions need not be answered here 
in full, because it is part of responsible engineering practice to continuously pose and 
debate such questions.  
 
The Sleipner case and the referenced investigative accounts into what caused the 
accident also highlight the responsibility engineers and engineering ethicists have to 
make accounts of their intentions, decisions, and actions. The investigations that took 
place after the accident were intently focused upon finding the source of the accident. 
The key reason this is so is because a new platform had to be built immediately. Despite 
this motivation, engineers at Norwegian Contractors, engineers in research groups at 
universities, engineers working for independent investigators, and engineering ethicists 
did work to produce narrative accounts which made the accident intelligible. To make an 
account of their actions is a responsibility of structural engineers, and in this case 
fulfillment of this responsibility had several positive consequences. First, the accounts 
made it possible to build a new platform. Second, the accounts serve to educate other 
engineers about their future actions. It is now easier to see the danger of skewed 
elements in finite element analysis. It is also easier to grasp the shortcomings of certain 
concrete codes governing the design process. Making these points explicit contributes to 
the responsibility structural engineers have to expose problems and seek solutions to 
those problems. All of these outcomes contribute to the evolution of what constitutes 
excellence in structural engineering. When practitioners fulfill these responsibilities, 
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they are furthering the standards of excellence and internal goods of their practice in the 
manner discussed by MacIntyre.  
 
The Sleipner platform accident provides us with an opportunity to establish what the 
structural engineers on the project should have done but more importantly, what 
structural engineers should be doing in current practice. Engineers must understand and 
follow the technical codes of their practice. In addition, they must know the limitations 
of those codes and more importantly, the theories of engineering which supplement and 
underlie the codes. Engineers are responsible for achieving the internal goods of their 
practice. This is done by fulfilling their responsibilities to technical codes and analytical 
methods. Making accounts of their intentions and decisions is a responsibility which 
allows others to judge how the other responsibilities have been fulfilled. All of these 
responsibilities are integral to what engineers do, that is identify and solve material 
problems.
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has ascribed the responsibilities of engineers, particularly structural 
engineers, by considering engineering as a practice with its own standards of excellence 
and internal goods.  In the process, the focus has been on the responsibilities engineers 
have qua engineers. The concepts we have adopted from Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral 
philosophy have been used to identify what engineers ought to do. These concepts 
include practices, standards of excellence, internal goods, traditions, narrative, and 
intelligibility. This paper has derived from the relationship between these concepts a list 
of responsibilities engineers have qua  engineers. These responsibilities have been 
applied to the specific practice of structural engineering. 
 
First, the concept of a practice is central to this paper’s objective of identifying the 
specific responsibilities of engineers, but it is equally as important to the philosophy of 
MacIntyre. MacIntyre identifies practices as important for moral philosophy because 
practices have existed throughout time and across cultures that preceded individual 
moral philosophies. According to MacIntyre, the social interactions which make 
practices are more fundamental than the changing rationalities of moral philosophy. This 
paper established engineering as a practice as a starting point for determining what 
engineers should be responsible for simply as engineers so that any debate regarding 
those responsibilities is a debate about engineering and not philosophy. 
 
MacIntyre’s definition of practices includes the concepts of standards of excellence and 
internal goods. These two concepts are the basis of what engineers are responsible for. 
This paper has identified technical codes, analytical methods, and abstract models as 
standards of engineering practice which do represent excellence in the practice. It is 
important for engineers to maintain these standards as excellences by continually 
working to know them thoroughly, successfully implement them in practice, identify 
short-comings of the standards, and improve upon them. This paper also proposed that a 
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number of outcomes of engineering work are internal goods of the practice. In structural 
engineering these goods are strength, serviceability, stability, safety, and efficiency. The 
case of the Sleipner A platform accident raised the question of how these goods should 
be ordered and prioritized. These questions may remain unanswered here for it is the job 
of practitioners to debate their function and importance to the practice. This is how 
practices excel. What is important is that structural engineers remain conscious of the 
relationship between standards of excellence and internal goods during the course of 
their work.  
 
The additional concepts of traditions, narrativity and intelligibility help us to further 
articulate the responsibilities of engineers. This paper has said that knowledge of the 
tradition of which one is a  part aids responsible behavior. Practitioners inherit 
responsibilities from the people which have gone before them in the history of the 
practice. They also inherit problems to solve. This process leads to the furthering of 
standards and goods. Narrativity helps us to put the decisions and intentions of 
practitioners into a context which makes sense of those actions. Though this is a paper 
solely on responsibilities, the ability to identify the intentions and decisions of 
practitioners is useful for deciding how to attribute blame and liability.  
 
During the course of this analysis, this paper has avoided making distinctions between 
harm and benefit of society and technical and social responsibilities. These matters are 
not so simple. However, issues of harm and benefit on the part of engineers can be 
addressed by understanding the it is the responsibility of engineers to pursue and achieve 
excellence in engineering. When this is done, engineers have fulfilled their obligations to 
society. It is apparent that if technical standards of excellence are followed with the 
intent of achieving internal goods then both social and technical obligations can be met. 
Just as the achievement of internal goods in 18th century European portraiture enriched 
the history of art, the achievement of internal goods in engineering leads to outcomes 
which better society.  One final point is that the responsible behavior of engineers is not 
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only good for engineering but is necessary for achieving and advancing the greater good 
for society.  
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